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The Accounts

of the Falklands/Ma1vinas War and a Projection of the
Future of the Isl-ands

To

name

a group of smal1 islands (+,100 square miles in total

proportion) of bare semi-rocky 1and, 300 miles off Lhe southern

coasL

of ArgenLina is to engage a constant debate that. is stil1 open today
and has yet

Lo

reach a resolut.ion. To the BriLish, Lhese islands are

the Falklands, and to the Argentines they are Lhe Malvinas.
To speak of

a

sub

j ect,

whom

first

discovered the Falklands/Malvinas is also

of debate. In reality,

there are no trustwort,hy historical

records that. can give unbiased informat,ion to
claim Lo the islands. The firsL nations

Eo

whom made

the firsL

make cl-aims about t.heir

'discovery' were Spain and England in t.he sixteent.h century.

Two

cenLuries after t.hese claims were made, France also made a claim to

the islands: "The famous French explorer Louis-Antoine de Bougainville
was said Lo be an early discoverer during voyages in the !760s."1 It
was from this claim t.hat. the Spanish-speaking world gave the islands

the

name

of 'Malvinas;' the sailors of the expedition were from

Saint.

Malo, France, thus t.hey named the islands 'Les Isles Malouines,'

a

term converted into the Spanish language as 'Las Islas Maluinas,'
which consequently evolved into

'Malvinas' in modern Spanish.

lEugene L Rasor, The Falklands/Malvinas Campaign (Westport, Connecticut:
Greenwood Press, L992) , 14.

*An

original accounL [on the French 'discovery'1 was by Antonie Pernety,
published in t.hree volumes in French in 1759 and in English in L787."2
Since their discovery in Lhe sixteenth century, there were never
permanent settlements on the islands until

the nineteenth cenLury.

Before l-833, Spain, France and Great, Brit.ain established setLlements,
but those were abandoned.
Since Argentina officially

gained its independence in 1818, the

Falklands/Malvinas were considered by Lhe new ArgenLine government

as

Argentine soil on the grounds that Spain had sovereignty over the
is1ands and the Argentine terriLory before the independence

movemenL.

The young Argentine administration then assumed that the islands were

a part of the mainl-and counLry of Argentina: "The Argentine position
claims that Argentina succeeded to Spain's sovereignty rights over the
Falkland Islands

(Malvinas) in

accordance with

principles

of

international 1aw."3 Spain, for its part, had claimed the islands

on

account of having discovered and ruled over the Americas, in which

on

May

4, L4g3 Pope Alexander VI 'awarded' Spain exclusive right Lo claim

and conLrof over any area west of an imaginary line parting from
approximately present-day BrazLl-' s western boundaries.
Due to political

Lensions in the nineteenth century, on January

2, 1833, Great Britain
permanent. settlement

invaded t.he Falklands/Malvinas and made

a

there. The islands remained under British conLrol

for over 145 years.

'tbid.
3Roberto

C. Laver, The FalkJands/MaTvinas Case (The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus
Nijhoff Publishers, 2001"), 7o.
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In

the

following

1950s,

Lhe decolonization

of

European

seLLlements around the world after Lhe end of World War If , Argent.ine

diplomats

made

at the United Nat.ions General Assembly for

demands

Great Britain to wit.hdraw f rom t,he Falklands/Malvinas islands. Talks
back and forth

between

diplomats

countries took place for over a
never achieved

and

Lo

decade

the United Nations from both
and a half. A resolution

was

relations beLween Argent.ina and Great Britain

deteriorat.ed.

It was

on

t,he morning of April 2, !982 that Argentine milit.ary

forces suddenly invaded the Falklands/Malvinas islands.
came

as

compleLe shock

invasion

to the isl-anders and to the United Kingdom.

long-stand dispute over Lhe islands had reached
conflict.

The

a

The

modern armed

Over 1,000 ArgenLine marines and Special Forces troops

battled the British

garison of 80 soldiers. The f ight last.ed for

about three hours, unLil- the British soldiers had no choice buL to
surrender Lo the overwhelming Argentine miliEary force.

The motives for t.his invasion came from Argentine's unpopular

milit.ary regime. At. the time, the country was going through a period
of extreme economic struggle and the regime was desperate to elevate
their reputation. Under t,he command of General Leopoldo Galt.ieri,
had been t.he military

who

dictator of Argentina for only four monLhs,

dD

amphibious milit.ary campaign was launched on a matter that would unify
t.he nation: the "repossession" of -Las Islas lulaTvinas.

Shortly after the Argentine forces had gained control over the
Falklands/Malvinas, another series of diplomatic talks began at the
Unit.ed NaLions. On April 3, 1982, the United Nations Security Council

?i
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passed Resolution 502 which called for Argent.ina to withdraw its

miliLary forces from the islands. This resolution
ArgenLine military

governmenL and aIl

ignored by the

was

hopes to

end

the conflict

peacefully were abandoned:
The then First Sea Lord Sir Henry Leach had assured Lhe prime
minister that, in terms of being able to make an effecLive
response he coufd have a task force ready at noLice to sail
within 48 hours. Aut.hority was, Lherefore, duly given for that
task force to assemble and to begin to sail- from the following
Monday morning of the 5th of April.a
The passage of t.he British task force from the United Kingdom to

the islands would take three-weeks, but. before t.he force could focus
on liberating

the Falklands/Malvinas, they had to reoccupy

South

Georgia Island, an Argentine-taken small British outpost on a group of

islands even smafler t,han the Falklands/ltalvinas. These islands are
locat.ed approximately 8OO miles southeast of the FaIklands/Malvinas

islands, but are of no significant. economic value. It was in the
waLers surrounding South Georgia t.hat. the

against Argentine forces on April

2,

f

irst

The British

submarine was crit.ically

began

1982, when t.he Argentine

submarine Santa Fe was spotted in the vicinit.y

helicopters.

ret,aliations
by British

war

helicopters engaged the Santa Fe.

The

put ouL of commission. ILs

crew

damaged and

was captured after bailing-ouL off Lhe shores of South Georgia Island

along with the small Argentine unit who had no option but to surrender
bef

ore the overpowering att,acks of t,he British Marines and British

naval fire support.

nrhe Falklands War, written by Steve Gillham and Bob Carruthers, 100 min.,
Dj-scovery Civilization, 2002, DW.

?
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The conflict was Laken to the Falklands/Malvinas within the first

week of May of that year, when British

bombers fl-ew out of the

Ascension Island near the equator on Lhe Atlantic and made a series of

raids on Stanly Port, the capital of t.he f slands to t.he east. Almost
immediately, the Argentine Air Force launched a series of air att,acks

against the British fleets, but

mosL

of them were intercepted by the

Royal Air Force and the Argentine air retaliat.ion was suppressed by

air-to-air

combat.

The mosL controversial episodes on t,he FalkIands/Ma1vinas
came

War

on May 2, L982, when three Argentine bat.Lle ships were spotted
courses set on the islands. At the time

when

Brit.ish intelligence found ouL about these battle ships, they

were

sailing wiLh their

within 30 miles from entering the

200

exclusion

zor:..e

that the British

government had declared around t,he islands. After consultation within

the British War Cabinet, t,he British submarine Congueror was ordered
to attack t.he Argent.ine warships on grounds thaL they posed a threat
to the BriLish taskforce. The Congueror was able to t.raiI the ships
and with its sophist,icated weaponry was able t.o sink the

General Belgrano. This ship was one of

Pearl Harbor

,-Tapanese

t.he

light cruiser

surviving ships at

t.he

attacks during World War II. After the war, the

United States had sold the ship to Argentina and it, was now at the
center of a world controversy. At the time of t.he sinking of the
General Belgrano, it.s course

was

Laking it back to Argentine port.

and

away from the Falklands/Ma1vinas and its location was well ouLside of

the exclusion zor,e. This was the first
forces and it

naval loss for the ArgenLine

claimed nearly half of the country's total number of

t

I
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casualties. With t.his at.tack the Argentine Navy was put out of

t.he

war. A11 the Argentine naval units returned to their ports to never
come ouL

again during Lhis war

Revenge for the sinking of the General Belgrano came raLher

quickly. Two days afLer the sinking of Lhe cruiser, df, Argentine jet
fighter aircraft fired a missile at Lhe
projectile

HMS

Sheffield. Even though the

did noL go off, t.he impact of the rocket and Lhe burning

rocket fuel claimed the lives of 20 British seamen aboard the ship.
Many oLhers were

burnt and wounded due to the attack.

Over the first

three weeks of the month of May, British ground

troops were deployed on the northwestern side of the islands to
confront, the already set.Lled troops of Argentines aL scattered posts.
They chose Lo begin ground retaliat.ion through the norLhwest because

Lhis zone was further away from the main concentrations of ground
Argentine troops near Lhe other end of t.he islands around t.he PorL of

Stanley. The major milestone in the Falklands/Ualvinas War

came on May

20, ]982 when Great Britain launched a fuI1-scale ground attack on the
Argent.ine occupying t.roops.
Over Lhe following three weeks the fate of t.he Falklands/tvlalvinas
was to be decided. British troops on land, with the support of heavy

gunship fire,

were able Lo guickly advance over t.he grassy and rough

terrain of the islands. Argent,ina retaliated furthermore on a series
of air strikes against BriLish ground troops and warships. These jeL
fighter aircrafts were flown out of the Argentine mainland because
Falklands/MaIvinas l-acked a sustainable airstrip

ghe Argentine war

ef f ort

. In aII,

it

t.he

Lo conEribute with

was during t.he British

land

t
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campaign that more lives were lost in combat, surprisingly not by

ground troop combat but rather by air raids against British

naval

ships off the coasL of Lhe Falklands/tqalvinas. The total number of
warships lost on the Brit.ish side after the devasEating attacks on the

Sheffield was Lwo destroyers and two frigates.

This proved

t,he

effectiveness of Argentine aerial tacLics.
Despite the l-oses of these naval war vessefs, the British Royal
Navy proved to dominate the waters, but on Lhe contrary, flo clear air

superiority was esLabl-ished by either side. The British forces lost a
total of 10 Harrier jet fighters and 24 helicopLers, while the
Argentines l-ost 25 helicopters and a total of 75 fixed-wing aircrafts.

Most of these were dest.royed while sit.ting at the hangers on the
FalkIands/Malvinas in British Special Forces surprise attacks and
Royal Air Force bombings.

The decisive last four battles over the Falklands/Malvinas

came

on the night of ,June 11, l-982 when a brigade-size British ground force

launched an aLtack against the last, st,anding, and the biggesL
Argentine post at Port SLanley. Alt.hough the major concentraLion of
Argentine troops was on t.his city, the firefights Look place on the
mountains in igs vicinity.

Three days laLter Lhe Argentine troops were

defeated on those same mountains and Stanley presented the 1ast threat
from occupying troop on the islands.

Fortunately for both sides, or the night of June a4, J.982, t.he
Argentine forces surrendered aE the Port of Stanley without a fight; a
bat.tle that could have claim the lives of soldiers from both sides as
General Mario
we1I as the civilians Lhat inhabited the city-port.

I

t

I

I
Men6ndez from

the Argentine Army was the official

signing officer of

the ArgenLine surrender Lo the Brit.ish forces. The War for

Lhe

Falklands/ttlalvinas had come to an end.

According to Argentine soldiers' accounLs, the Argentine ground

forces did not have the necessary eguipmenL to fight t.he war. Many of
the Argentine weaponry was faulLy and in many cases ammunition

was

expired. In one parLicular case, an Argentine veteran, .Iorge Altieri,
tells

how mosL of their

rifles

jammed upon engaging

British forces. Such f actors played a vit.al role in the

the advancing
def

eat of

t.he

Argentine ground forces.
The news of the surrender of the troops was devastat.ing for the

people of Argent.ina. Wit.hin days of it,

Leopoldo Galtieri was removed

from power and for t.he next several years he faced numerous civilian
and military court t.rials were he was found guilty of mismanagement of

the war along with other civil
command

righLs viofations committed under his

during the time of the Milit.ary .Tunta government. Galtieri

served several years in prison for his crimes but in 1991 he received

a pardon from the then Argentine President Carlos

Menem.

To t.he surviving soldiers of both Armies, the events of the
Falklands/Malvinas War were psychologically devastat,ing. More British

veterans, Iives have been c1aimed by suicide Lhan the number of
British soldiers that died during the conflict.

By May of 2002, the

tot.al number of suicide cases among t.he Falklands/Mal-vinas veterans
had reached 264. A total of 258 British soldiers were killed

during

Ehe struggle to reEake the islands. Up Eo the presenE year, there has

I

t
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been an estimated 400 cases of suicide among the Argentine veterans of

this war.
CurrenLIy, the Falklands/l'talvinas isl-ands are an overseas
expansion of t.he United Kingdom. They are under the conLrol

and

administration of the British governmenL, but, Argentina st.i11 claims
them as their owrr. Nonetheless, the two naLions have diplomatic and

trading relations.
Af

ter t.he war in

]-982

, Great Brit.ain set.tled a

maj

or military

base in Stanley Lo prevent the possible overrun of the islands should
diplomacy with Argentine fail

again. Commercial flights

land at this

massive milit.ary complex on a daily bases, but the tensions of war are

are commonly escorLed

Commercial aircrafts

presenL in everyday life.

by Royal Air Force jet fighters Lo ensure Lhe security of civilian air
travel-ers.

While Great Britain

was

favored by most nations for retaking the

Falklands/Malvinas in L882, Lhe debate over whether Argentina or

Lhe

United Kingdom has Lhe right to claim and administer the islands is

a

constant Lopic of debate.

In the end, t.he islands have proven to

be

purely a symbol of

national pride for Great Britain and Argentina. The islands do
presenL

in

them

a major world economical advantage. The major source of
is due to

f

ishing. When t.he worl-d

Jorge Luis Borges, was
Falklands/ualvinas conflict,

asked
he

renown

about his
replied that

own

The

not,

income

Argentine writer
opinion of
conflict

the

between

Argentina and Great Britain was as "a guarrel between two bald men for

t

I

I
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possession of

counLry

a

needed

comb!"s wiLh this statement, he implied that neit.her

the islands,

that t.he

conf

lict

was a senseless war

between two nations that did not have a purposeful use of a small
group of bare-lands in the South Atlantic Ocean.

While t.he future of the Falk1ands/Malvinas is uncertain due

Lo

the ArgenLine's current claims over t.he islands, a conclusion t.o what
the history

nati-on these islands belong Lo cannot be drawn. After all,

of the colonizat.ion of the New Wor1d was shaped t.hrough bloody
bat.tles. It. can then be said that. in our modern era, Great Britain
earned Lhe tit.le to the islands by def eating Argent.ina

The unforLunaLe reality

has

'

of the fragmenLed world we live in is

that naLions wage war against, each other over economic, political
and/or sovereignty issues without. regarding the loss of human 1ife.
The former United States Secretary of Defense during the Vietnam

era, Robert S.
human

McNamera,

War

declared in an interview in 2003 that war is

nature and that it cannoE be avoided. History textbooks presenL

the Falklands/Malvinas War as a modern confl-ict that, Iasted a couple
months from the morning of April 2,
when the first
Lhem

EuroPean

1-982;

but in reality, it

explorers set. their eyes on them

for their empires. It. is a conflict t.hat has not. yet

sRasorr

5

began

and claimed

ended

ftr
11
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